

# *Critical BGP Prefixes: A Measurement-based Analysis on Critical Infrastructure Security*

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


(3) BGP was introduced almost 3 decades ago where there were a few ASes and network operators knew each other, so, **there was no need to built in trust to the BGP**.



(4) Due to this inherent limitation (lack of built-in trust), BGP currently suffers from a variety of attacks such as ***Prefix Hijacks*** and ***Route Leaks*** (mitm, dos, impersonation).

# The (zombie) roadmap to enhancing Internet routing security



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# A first-look into the roadmap



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# Risk-based Planning for NetOps

## Baseline Actions for All Network Operators

The recommended actions below apply to all network types, meaning all network service providers and entities that operate enterprise networks or hold their own IP address resources. These recommendations are of particular importance to the networks used by critical infrastructure,<sup>50</sup> SLTT governments, and any organization dependent on Internet access for purposes that the entity considers to be of high value.

1. **Risk-Based Planning.** Every network operator should develop, maintain, and periodically update a cybersecurity risk management plan. To inform both near- and long-term plans to implement BGP security measures, all network operators should explicitly address the security and resilience of Internet routing in their organization's cybersecurity risk assessment, cybersecurity risk management analysis, and operational plans and procedures. All network operators should consider the following actions in their assessment:
  - a. Inventory all Internet number resource holdings, both AS numbers (ASNs) and IP address blocks held by the organization, and identify the various points of contact for each resource.
    - i. Identify if any of these address blocks are reassigned from another distinct organization.
    - ii. Identify any address blocks that have been reallocated or reassigned to other organizations.
    - iii. Identify if each AS and IP address allocation is covered by an RSA with the appropriate RIRs.
    - iv. Ensure that up-to-date contact information is entered and maintained in the appropriate RIR databases.
  - b. Identify the neighboring ASes with which the organization interconnects to exchange BGP routing information and/or IP data traffic.
    - i. For each such network, identify the nature of the business relationship with the other AS (i.e., whether it an upstream transit service provider, a transit services customer, or a peering connection reflecting a settlement-free relationship).
  - c. Document how the organization uses BGP routing by identifying:
    - i. Which of the organization's own address prefixes originate from the organization's ASes using BGP announcements;
    - ii. Which of the organization's address prefixes rely on the ASes of other organizations to originate their BGP announcements;
    - iii. Which address prefixes held by other entities originate from the organization's networks using BGP announcements; and
    - iv. Which processes (e.g., inter-domain traffic engineering) or services (e.g., DDoS mitigation services) might alter the origin AS or granularity (i.e., prefix length) of the organization's BGP announcements.
  - d. Identify information systems and services internal to the organization that require Internet access and the corresponding address prefixes that are announced in BGP to enable that access. Assess the **criticality** (e.g., organizational mission impact) of maintaining resilient Internet routes for each address prefix originated from the organization's networks or originated on its behalf from other networks.
  - e. Identify all contracted external/outsource service providers (e.g., web, DNS, email, storage, etc.) critical to the organization's internal operations and document how routing to and from these services is provided. Assess the **criticality** of maintaining resilient Internet routes to the organization's external service providers.
  - f. Establish, communicate, monitor, and maintain a risk management strategy, responsibilities, and policies for Internet routing. This may include evaluating the **impact** should the availability or integrity of BGP routing to the systems, services, and service providers identified above be disrupted.
  - g. Based on the organization's cyber risk management strategy, identify address prefixes to prioritize for ROA creation and take action to do so.
    - i. Consider prioritizing ROA creation for IP address blocks that contain the most **critical** services or have the most straightforward routing. In cases where ROA creation is prioritized for different address blocks, identify the specific criteria used for this decision process.
  - h. Based on the risk management strategy, prioritize ASes for ROV coverage.
  - i. Continue to monitor developments in BGP routing security, including best practice guidance for adopting new security mechanisms, threat analysis and incident reports, and new developments in standards and their commercialization. Factor any changes in this landscape into future risk management plan revisions.

# Our part

Let's automate this Risk Assessment process...

...and bridge the gap between policy-based recommendations and actual network practice!

Let's implement an open-source BGP-based Risk Assessment Toolbox!







this toolbox will drive a series of studies, each exploring different aspects of BGP security

# Our implementation so far: on paper


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
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# A Measurement-based Approach






# Input Selection: EU Critical Infrastructure Sectors




- To evaluate our approach, we apply our current toolbox to real-world datasets from *Critical Infrastructure* sectors.
- The term *Critical Infrastructure* sectors (as recognized by governments and policymakers) refers to *essential systems whose disruption would significantly impact public health, safety, and economic stability*.
- Failures or attacks on underlying systems (such as BGP or DNS) could *cripple* critical online services/domains, disrupt communication, and *impact* essential operations worldwide.

# Scope: Internet-facing part vs Core Infrastructure



# A Measurement-based Approach




# The input: basisbeveiliging.nl

## Datasets

These datasets contain all data currently displayed on this website. These datasets are suitable for automatic processing and importing in other sites like this.

Map	Domains	Organizations	Explanations
Municipalities	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Cyber Security Companies	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Healthcare	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Provinces	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Water boards	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Safety regions	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Political parties	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Government	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Education / University	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Education / University of Applied Sciences (HBO)	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Education / Junior College (MBO)	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Education / Secondary Education	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Education / Primary Education	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Ministry of General Affairs	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Ministry of Defence	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a> <a href="#">csv</a> <a href="#">ods</a> <a href="#">xlsx</a>	<a href="#">json</a>




- ❖ **Basisbeveiliging.nl** is an initiative by the **Internet Cleanup Foundation**, which assesses and publicly reports on the basic digital security of Dutch organizations across sectors like government, healthcare, and education.



# The input: hardenize.com

## Hardenize Dashboards

Hardenize dashboards are a quick and convenient way to understand the security of a group of web sites. We continuously monitor all dashboard hosts to always keep the statistics up to date.



**Education**  
22 host(s)

**Energy**  
77 host(s)

**Financial Market**  
15 host(s)

**Fintech**  
78 host(s)

**Food**  
19 host(s)

**Health**  
135 host(s)



- ❖ **Hardenize.com** offers comprehensive assessments and public reports of security configurations, enabling organizations across multiple countries (i.e., CH, EE, LT, SE) to monitor and improve their digital infrastructure.

✓ the toolbox...


✓ the approach...

✓ the data..

Time for Results!




# Multi-homing adoption of *Critical ASes*



CDF: How much of the data (y-axis) is at or below an x-axis point?


★ *Critical ASes* are **resilient** in terms of multihoming, since, not a single AS relies only on a single upstream provider. Single-homed ASes are SPOF!

# Visibility Critical BGP Prefixes




- ★ Constant monitoring is important: Low visibility could indicate that a prefix may become unreachable or lead to service degradation.

# Jurisdictional Dependencies of *Critical BGP Prefixes*




Netherlands - Europe Map



Netherlands - US Map



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# Anomalies in Critical ASes



- ★ Some Critical ASes suffer from **frequent or prolonged network outages**, highlighting operational instability or lack of redundancy in CI infrastructure.
- ★ **Large ASes (ATT, Cogent, Amazon)** experience **numerous BGP hijacks**, showing that even well-resourced networks remain vulnerable to routing attacks.

# Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)



## Route Origin Authorization (RoA)

A cryptographic statement that declares which AS is authorized to announce a specific IP prefix.



## Route Origin Validation (RoV)

A router-side mechanism that checks BGP announcements against RoAs enabling networks to **filter out unauthorized/invalid routes**.

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- ★ We aim to bridge the gap between policy-based recommendations and actual network practice. To that end, we design and implement a *BGP-based Risk Assessment Toolbox*.
- ★ Using our toolbox, we investigate the network and security postures of *Critical BGP Prefixes* across 5 EU countries. Two important insights derived are:
  - *Critical BGP Prefixes* exhibit a heavy concentration in the country of origin and the US, which suggests that disruptions (or political-regulatory shifts) in US-based networks can potentially propagate globally.
  - *Critical ASes* demonstrate high RoA compliance but low RoV enforcement undermining the overall RPKI security.

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  - *Critical BGP Prefixes* exhibit a heavy concentration in the country of origin and the US, which suggests that disruptions (or political-regulatory shifts) in US-based networks can potentially propagate globally.
  - *Critical ASes* demonstrate high RoA compliance but low RoV enforcement undermining the overall RPKI security.
- ★ Netops can use such a tool to: i) prioritize RoA of *Critical BGP Prefixes*, ii) filter low-RoV enforcing ASes, or iii) favor certain AS paths based on the intermediate RoV scores.

# Backup Slides

# AS2Type

Category	Count	Category	Count
Computer and Information Technology	1051	Online Informational Content	8
Internet Service Provider (ISP)	854	Elementary and Secondary Schools	8
Hosting and Cloud Provider	327	Nursing, Residential Care Facilities	8
Software Development	245	Print Media	7
Service	177	Electric Power Generation	7
Other	140	Research and Development Organizations	7
Retail Stores, Wholesale, and E-commerce	103	Accountants, Tax Preparers, Payroll	5
Finance and Insurance	102	Chemical and Pharmaceutical Manufact.	5
Law, Business, and Consulting Services	88	Machinery	5
Media, Publishing, and Broadcasting	81	Civil Engineering Construction	5
Government and Public Administration	76	Hospitals and Medical Centers	4
Banks, Credit Card Companies, Mortgage Prov.	59	Recreation, Sports, and Performing Arts	4
Education and Research	47	Personal Care and Lifestyle	3
Government and Regulatory Agencies	45	Buildings	3
Computer and Network Security	43	Music and Video Industry	3
Military, Defense, National Security	33	Water Transportation	3
Manufacturing	26	Other Schools and Instruction	3
Technology Consulting Services	26	Casinos and Gambling	2
Community Groups and Nonprofits	26	Automotive and Transportation	2
Health Care Services	25	Postal Services and Couriers	2
Construction and Real Estate	23	Steam and Air-Conditioning Supply	2
Phone Provider	22	Libraries and Archives	2
Investment, Portfolio Management	21	Clothing, Fashion, Luggage	2
Radio and Television Providers	18	Food, Grocery, Beverages	2
Freight, Shipment, and Postal Services	18	Human Rights and Social Advocacy	9
Insurance Carriers and Agencies	17	Social Assistance	9
Unknown	15	Buildings, Repair, Maintenance	8
Online Music and Video Streaming Services	13	Search	8
Travel and Accommodation	13	Water Supply and Irrigation	1
Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools	13	Museums, Historical Sites, Zoos, Nature Parks	1
Museums, Libraries, and Entertainment	12	Other	1
Electronics and Computer Components	12	Medical Laboratories and Diagnostic Centers	1
Real Estate (Residential and/or Commercial)	10	Hotels, Motels, Inns	1
Agriculture, Mining, and Refineries	9	Sewage Treatment	1
Utilities (Excluding Internet Service)	9	Law Enforcement, Public Safety	1

# The input: why is this suitable for our analysis?



## Sector-Focused

Both platforms mainly assess organizations in **critical sectors** (e.g., government, healthcare, education, and finance) aligning directly with the scope of this study.

## Geographically Relevant

These tools offer **region-specific datasets** (e.g., Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Switzerland), which supports our focus on **European services** and jurisdictionally scoped analysis.

## Security-Oriented and Publicly Available


Their datasets reflect **actively monitored, real-world services** with known security profiles. This makes them ideal for infrastructure measurement through DNS and BGP mapping.

## RoA Status of *Critical BGP Prefixes*

Country	Valid (%)
Estonia	90.25
Lithuania	90.03
Netherlands	85.43
Switzerland	82.73
Sweden	67.41

- ★ NetOps should prioritize signing of no-RoA *Critical BGP Prefixes*!
- ★ Policy-makers (e.g., FCC, ENISA, ICANN) should incentivize RPKI compliance:
  - Tax benefits
  - Grants to smaller ISPs

# RoV Status of *Critical ASes*




- ★ Without RoV, invalid routes remain unfiltered and undermine the effectiveness of RPKI.
- ★ Netops could prioritize AS paths on their routing tables based on the individual RoV scores of intermediate ASes in the path!



# Collateral Impact: Measuring Indirect RPKI Protection

- ★ Collateral Impact suggests that even if an AS doesn't implement RoV, it can still be protected by upstream ASes which filter invalid routes!




Example: AS3 doesn't fall victim of AS666, since, AS2 implements RoV

# Collateral Impact: Measuring Indirect RPKI Protection

- ★ Collateral Impact suggests that even if an AS doesn't implement RoV, it can still be protected by upstream ASes which filter invalid routes!
- ★ **Filtering can only propagate in one direction:** A provider can protect its customers (c2p), but a customer cannot protect its provider (p2c), nor can peers protect peers (p2p).
- ★ How we measure it:
  - We target only *Critical Prefixes* with valid RoAs (since RoV wouldnt make sense)
  - We walk the *Critical AS path* hop-by-hop
  - For each c2p link we identify, we update the overall path score with the individual RoV score of the provider

# Collateral Impact of RoV deployment

- ★ Many *Critical AS paths* have low RoV scores, with minimum values near zero, making them **vulnerable to hijacks**.
- ★ Average and maximum RoV scores **vary across countries**, showing partial but inconsistent adoption of RPKI validation.
- ★ Collateral RoV suggests that **paths benefit from** neighboring ASes with **stronger RoV practices**.



# Future Work: Differentiate between CDN vs non-CDN hosted domains

